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Algorithms for Globally-Optimal Secure Signaling
over Gaussian MIMO Wiretap Channels Under
Interference Constraints
Limeng Dong, Sergey Loyka, Yong Li
Abstract—Multi-user Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel is con-
sidered under interference power constraints (IPC), in addition
to the total transmit power constraint (TPC). Algorithms for
global maximization of its secrecy rate are proposed. Their
convergence to the secrecy capacity is rigorously proved and a
number of properties are established analytically. Unlike known
algorithms, the proposed ones are not limited to the MISO
case and are proved to converge to a global rather than local
optimum in the general MIMO case, even when the channel
is not degraded. In practice, the convergence is fast as only
a small to moderate number of Newton steps is required to
achieve a high precision level. The interplay of TPC and IPC is
shown to result in an unusual property when an optimal point
of the max-min problem does not provide an optimal transmit
covariance matrix in some (singular) cases. To address this
issue, an algorithm is developed to compute an optimal transmit
covariance matrix in those singular cases. It is shown that this
algorithm also solves the dual (nonconvex) problems of globally
minimizing the total transmit power subject to the secrecy
and interference constraints; it provides the minimum transmit
power and respective signaling strategy needed to achieve the
secrecy capacity, hence allowing power savings.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ever-growing number of wireless users and their traffic,
open system architectures and aggressive frequency re-use as
well as operation in unlicensed bands envisioned in 5G sys-
tems [1] create significant potential for inter-user interference,
which needs to be carefully controlled and mitigated. Multiple
antennas offer a significant potential for doing so in the space
domain, especially in the context of massive MIMO [2].
This approach to interference mitigation and control has been
investigated earlier in the context of cognitive radio (CR) [3],
where secondary users are allowed to use the same bandwidth
as primary users (who are the license holders) but are required
to cause no significant interference to them. On the other
hand, open system architectures and co-existence of several
users in the same bandwidth in combination with the broadcast
nature of wireless channels make transmissions vulnerable to
eavesdropping of confidential information (e.g. e-commerce
and e-health, mobile banking, Internet transactions, etc.) so
This paper was presented in part at the 5th IEEE Global Conference on
Signal and Information Processing, Montreal, Canada, Nov. 2017 [40].
L. Dong is with the Ministry of Education Key Lab for Intelligent Networks
and Network Security, School of Information and Communications Engi-
neering, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, Shaanxi, 710049, China, e-mail:
dlm nwpu@hotmail.com. This work was done when L. Dong was visiting
the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University of
Ottawa, Canada.
S. Loyka is with the School of Electrical Engineering and Computer
Science, University of Ottawa, Canada, e-mail: sergey.loyka@uottawa.ca.
Y. Li is with the School of Electronics and Information, Northwestern
Polytechnical University, Xian, China, e-mail: ruikel@nwpu.edu.cn.
that some form of secrecy protection is needed. In this context,
physical-layer security approach has emerged as a valuable
complement to the traditional cryptography-based approach
for modern wireless networks [4]-[6]. In this approach, the
secrecy of communications is ensured at the physical layer
by exploiting the properties of wireless communication chan-
nels so that no transmitted information can be recovered by
malicious eavesdroppers. Wiretap channel (WTC) is widely
used as a model of secrecy communications and its secrecy
capacity became the key metric of performance [4]-[9].
A. Literature review
Using this approach in combination with MIMO systems
offers significant new opportunities for enhancing the secrecy
of multi-user wireless systems via space-domain processing.
The MIMO WTC model became a popular tool to study
physical-layer security, where the transmitter (Tx) sends confi-
dential information to the receiver (Rx) while an eavesdropper
(Ev) observes the transmission. The main performance metric,
which is an ultimate upper bound to reliable and secret
communications, is the secrecy capacity, defined operationally
as the maximum achievable rate on the Tx-Rx link subject
to the reliability (low error probability) and secrecy (low
information leakage on the Tx-Ev link) criteria [4]-[6]. The
secrecy capacity of Gaussian MISO (multiple-input single-
output) WTC has been established in [7] and further extended
to the full MIMO case in [8][9], where the optimality of
Gaussian signaling has also been established.
Hence, finding the secrecy capacity amounts to finding an
optimal input (transmit) covariance matrix. This problem is
still open analytically in the general case since the under-
lying optimization problem is not convex and hence very
hard to solve, either numerically or analytically, while some
special cases (MISO, full-rank MIMO, rank-1 MIMO, weak
eavesdropper, identical right singular vectors of Rx and Ev
channels, etc.) have been solved [7]-[13]. The two Tx antennas
case was studied in details in [14], the massive MIMO setting
was considered in [15][16], and finite-alphabet signaling was
also studied [17]; an overview of recent results can be found
in [5][6][17].
The Gaussian MISO WTC with multiple eavesdroppers was
considered in [18], where the original non-convex problem
was transformed to a quasi-convex one that can be solved as
a sequence of convex feasibility problems using the bisection
method. This MISO case with multiple Evs was also studied
in [19], including a deterministic channel uncertainty model,
where the original non-convex problem was transformed to a
2convex semi-definite one using determinantal inequality and
the fact that optimal covariance is of rank-1 so that the in-
equality becomes equality; this new problem can be efficiently
solved using existing convex solvers. The MISO channel with
multi-eavesdroppers and stochastic channel uncertainty was
studied in [20]. Unfortunately, the multi-Ev studies above
did not establish the optimality of Gaussian signaling (but
rather assumed it) and they cannot be extended to the full
MIMO case since there exists no equivalent scalar channel
anymore and optimal covariance is not necessarily rank-1.
New approaches are needed. In this respect, the multi-Ev case,
where eavesdroppers are not cooperative, is equivalent to a
compound WTC whose operational capacity was established
in [21][22] by demonstrating that Gaussian signaling is opti-
mal. However, an optimal Tx covariance matrix is not known
in the general case either.
Since there is no closed-form solution in the general case,
even for a single eavesdropper, a number of numerical algo-
rithms have been developed to maximize secrecy rates [23]-
[25]. As the original problem is non-convex, these algorithms
use some form of convexification, where the non-convex part
of the objective (the Ev part) is expanded in a Taylor series
and only first two terms are kept (i.e. the non-convex part
is linearized, either explicitly or implicitly) [23]-[25]. Then,
the approximated but convex problem is solved, an expansion
point is iteratively updated and the process is repeated. The
fundamental difficulty with this approach is that, even if the
algorithm can be proved to converge, a convergence point
is just a Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) point, but, due to the
non-convex nature of the original (not approximate) problem,
the KKT conditions are not sufficient for global optimality.
Hence, a convergence point of these algorithms can be a local
rather than global maximum, an inflection point, a local or
even global minimum [44]-[46]. All these algorithms lack
provable convergence to a global optimum due to the non-
convex nature of the original problem and no way is known
to overcome this fundamental difficulty. Furthermore, the gap
to a global optimum is not known either.
Using a different approach, an algorithm with provable
convergence to a global optimum in the general MIMO case
(with single eavesdropper) was proposed in [26]. The key
idea was to avoid any form of convexification/approximation
or alternating optimization (for which proving convergence
to a global optimum is out of reach), but rather to use the
max-min formulation in [8][9], without any approximations.
However, this algorithm cannot be used in interference-
constrained environments (e.g. CR) due to three fundamental
issues: (i) while the feasible set is isotropic under the Tx
power constraint (TPC) alone (no limits on eigenvectors, only
on the sum of eigenvalues of the Tx covariance matrix), it
is not isotropic anymore when interference power constraints
(IPC) are added and this has a dramatic impact on the KKT
conditions and numerical algorithms used to solve them; (ii)
any of the constraints, including TPC, can be inactive under
IPCs while the TPC is always active without IPC; furthermore,
it is not known in advance which constraint is active and
which is not so that an algorithm is required to determine this
automatically; finally, (iii) a global convergence proof must
include the interference constraints and the fact that some of
them may be inactive.
An interference-constrained Gaussian MISO WTC with a
single Ev was studied in [27]. It was shown that Gaussian
signalling is optimal and the operational secrecy capacity can
be expressed as a quasi-convex optimization problem, which
can be subsequently reduced to a sequence of convex feasi-
bility problems [27] and they can be further solved using ex-
isting convex solvers. An imperfect channel state information
(CSI) was accounted for in [28]. Secrecy rate maximization
of interference-constrained MISO (single-antenna Rx) WTC
under single or multiple non-cooperative Evs and various
channel assumptions (fixed, quasi-static or ergodic fading with
full or partial channel state information) was studied in [29]-
[32]; artificial noise and various beamforming solutions were
proposed to maximize the secrecy rate.
However, it is not known whether these solutions are opti-
mal, i.e. achieve the secrecy capacity, and what is the actual
gap to the capacity. In addition, all these studies are limited
to the MISO case, i.e. single-antenna receivers, and cannot
be extended to the full MIMO case due to the fundamental
limitations of the approach they use, i.e. transforming a
MISO channel into an equivalent scalar channel and reducing
(or relaxing) the original non-convex problem to a convex
or quasi-convex one. In the full MIMO case, there is no
equivalent scalar channel, beamforming is not an optimal
strategy in general, the original problem is not convex and
it is not known how to transform it into an equivalent convex
or quasi-convex problem.
B. Contributions
Thus, a new approach is needed to deal with the full MIMO
WTC under interference constraints. Unlike the previous
studies in [27]-[32], in this paper we target capacity-achieving
signaling over the full MIMO WTC under interference con-
straints and to this end develop an algorithm with provable
convergence to a global optimum.
The proposed algorithm is based on the max-min secrecy
capacity characterization originally developed in [8][9] under
the TPC alone and later extended to the joint constraints
(TPC+IPC) in [33], where the optimality of Gaussian sig-
naling was established in the general MIMO case under the
joint constraints and the max and max-min secrecy capacity
characterizations of [8][9] were shown to hold as well (even
though the feasible set under the joint constraints is not
isotropic).
However, no analytical solutions to either the max or max-
min problems above are known in the general case (some
special cases have been solved in [33][34], but the general
case remains an open problem). No algorithmic solution
with provable convergence to global optimum under the joint
constraints is known either. Therefore, a numerical algorithm
is needed to solve the problems and thus to find an optimal Tx
covariance matrix and the secrecy capacity. Such algorithm is
proposed in the present paper. The distinct features of this new
algorithm are that (i) it finds globally-optimum (i.e. capacity-
achieving) transmit covariance matrix, (ii) its convergence to
a global (rather than local) optimum is rigorously proved, and
(iii) it is of polynomial complexity.
3It should be emphasized that the standard max-only for-
mulation of the secrecy rate maximization problem, which is
dominant in the current literature, see e.g. [23]-[25], does not
allow one to build an algorithm with guaranteed convergence
to a global optimum in the general case due to the lack of
problem’s convexity (which makes provable global conver-
gence out of reach, see e.g. [35][44]-[46]). Algorithms based
on the max-only formulation face a fundamental difficulty
since they may get trapped in a local optimum and hence their
performance may be rather poor. For example, we show in Fig.
5 that the Taylor expansion-based sub-optimal algorithm as in
[25] does get trapped at local optima (or stationary points),
far away from the global one, resulting in poor performance
and hence should be used with caution (or avoided at all)
when the original problem is not convex. In general, non-
convex problems are NP-hard (of exponential complexity)
and the best one can hope for is convergence to a stationary
point, which can be a local (rather than global) maximum,
an inflection point or even a local minimum [44]-[46]. A
convergence point may also depend on initial (starting) point,
so that some bad initial points may result in bad results
(e.g. a local minimum rather than maximum). The only
known exception to this is the MISO case, where problem
re-formulation is possible to a quasi-convex or some other
tractable form, but this re-formulation is not possible in the
general MIMO case (since there exists no equivalent scalar
channel). On the other hand, the max-min characterization of
[8][9][33], while appearing to be more complicated due to
two conflicting optimizations, is in fact more tractable due to
its convex-concave nature.
In this paper, we use the max-min characterization to
construct an algorithm with provable convergence to a global
optimum in the general MIMO case. This algorithm includes
three key components: (i) the residual-form Newton method,
(ii) the barrier method and (iii) backtracking line search.
The barrier method is needed to absorb inequality constraints
into the objective function, while the residual-form Newton
method, in combinations with backtracking line search, gen-
erates a sequence of points which converge to a globally-
optimal max-min point for which the objective value is the
secrecy capacity. When combined properly, they are proved
to converge to a globally-optimal solution with any desired
accuracy. In practice, only a small to moderate number of
Newton steps is needed to achieve a high precision level.
While the algorithm above computes the secrecy capacity
via a saddle-point of the max-min problem, its optimal covari-
ance matrix is not necessarily a maximizer of the secrecy rate
and hence cannot be used for globally-optimal (i.e. capacity-
achieving) signaling in the general case. This unusual effect is
entirely due to the interplay between TPC and IPC and cannot
be found under the TPC alone, as in [8][9][26]. To address this
issue, we establish general properties of the secrecy capacity
as a function of Tx power and, based on it, develop an iter-
ative bisection algorithm in Section IV (Algorithm 2), which
evaluates numerically an optimal covariance in the general
case with any desired accuracy and prove its convergence.
Numerical experiments show that the proposed algorithms
converge fast in practice and achieve higher secrecy rates
(significantly higher when the channel is not degraded and its
negative eigenmode is dominant) than the known sub-optimal
algorithms.
Motivated by energy efficiency issues, dual problems of
minimizing globally the total transmit power subject to se-
crecy and interference power constraints are considered in
Section V. Since these problems are not convex, standard tools
of convex optimization do not apply and they are difficult to
solve (where ”solve” means finding global rather than local
optimum). Yet, Proposition 6 shows that Algorithm 2 solves
these problems as well. This provides the globally-minimum
Tx power and respective signaling strategy needed to achieve
a target secrecy rate under interference constraints.
Collectively, the two proposed algorithms evaluate the
secrecy capacity and globally-optimal signaling strategy to
achieve it in the interference-constrained multi-user Gaus-
sian MIMO wiretap channel in the general case. This is
substantially different from the known algorithms in [23]-
[25][27][28], which either operate over a MISO channel only
or which converge to a stationary (KKT) point only, which can
be a local rather than global maximum, an inflection point,
a local or even global minimum, and for which a proof of
convergence to a global optimum is out of reach.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
introduces the channel model and gives its operational secrecy
capacity; the model is general enough to include per-antenna
power constraints as well. The algorithm for global maxi-
mization of secrecy rates over interference-constrained multi-
user Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel is developed in Section
III and its convergence is rigorously proved. Based on this
algorithm, Section IV presents a bisection-based algorithm
to evaluate numerically an optimal Tx covariance with any
desired accuracy in the general case and its convergence
is proved. Dual problems of minimizing the total transmit
power subject to secrecy and interference power constraints
are considered in Section V and Algorithm 2 is shown to solve
these problems as well. Finally, numerical experiments to
illustrate algorithms’ performance and practical convergence
are given in Section VI.
Notations: bold lower-case letters (a) and capitals (A)
denote vectors and matrices respectively; A ≥ 0 denotes
positive semi-definite matrixA;AT is transposition whileA+
is Hermitian conjugation; tr(A) is the trace; vec(A) is the
vector obtained by stacking all columns of matrixA on top of
each other and veh(A) is the vector obtained by vectorizing
only the lower triangular part of A; diag(A) is a diagonal
matrix with the same diagonal entries as in A; E {·} is a
statistical expectation; ⊗ is the Kronecker product; |a| and
|A| are the Euclidian norm of vector a and determinant of
matrix A; I is the identity matrix of appropriate size.
II. CHANNEL MODEL AND SECRECY CAPACITY
Let us consider the standard Gaussian MIMO WTC model
as shown in Fig. 1, where the transmitter (Tx) sends confiden-
tial information to the receiver (Rx) while N eavesdroppers
(Ev), who may be just other users in a multi-user system,
intercept the transmission; the Evs are assumed to be cooper-
ative, which is the most conservative assumption in terms of
4Fig. 1. A block diagram of the Gaussian multi-user MIMO wiretap channel
under interference constraints. H1, H2i and H3j are the channel matrices
to the Rx, each Ev and PR respectively; x is the Tx signal; y1, y2i and y3j
are the received signal at the Rx, each Ev and PR respectively; ξ1, ξ2i and
ξ3j are respective noise components.
secrecy1. The objective is to ensure reliable communications
between the Tx and Rx (the reliability criterion) while keeping
the Evs ignorant about transmitted information (the secrecy
criterion). In an interference-constrained (IC) multi-user en-
vironment, such as cognitive radio, the interference generated
by the Tx to primary receivers (PR), who represent licensed
users of the system, must not exceed certain thresholds. The
secrecy capacity is defined operationally as the largest trans-
mission rate on the Tx-Rx link subject to the reliability and
secrecy criteria [4]-[9], where the reliability criterion ensures
arbitrary low error probability at the Rx while recovering the
transmitted message; the secrecy criterion ensures arbitrary
low information leakage to the Evs. The Tx has m antennas,
while the Rx and each Ev have n1 and n2i (i = 1, 2, ..., N )
antennas, respectively. In the discrete-time AWGN MIMO
channel model, the signals received by the Rx and each Ev
can be expressed as
y1 = H1x+ ξ1, y2i = H2ix+ ξ2i (1)
where y1(2i) are the respective received signals at Rx (i-th
Ev), x is the transmitted signal, ξ1(2i) represent zero-mean
unit-variance i.i.d. noise at the Rx (i-th Ev) end;H1(2i) are the
channel matrices collecting channel gains from the Tx to the
Rx (i-th Ev). In addition to this and following the interference-
constrained model, there are K PRs equipped with n3j (j =
1, 2, ...,K) antennas each. The received signal at j-th PR is
similarly expressed as
y3j = H3jx+ ξ3j (2)
whereH3j and ξ3j are the channel matrix and zero-mean unit-
variance i.i.d. noise. For future use, let Wk = H
+
kHk, k =
1, 2 and let W3j = H
+
3jH3j , j = 1, 2, ...,K . We assume that
the full channel state information (CSI) is available to the
Tx, Rx and each Ev (which is motivated by modern adaptive
system design, where channel is estimated at the Rx and send
back to the Tx via a feedback link; when Evs are just other
users in the system, they also share their CSI with the base
station).
1This cooperation is possible in e.g. cloud radio access networks (C-RAN),
where users’ baseband data is centrally stored and processed [41]-[43] and
hence a malicious user (super-Ev) can exploit it for eavesdropping.
Overall, the transmission is subject to the TPC and multiple
IPCs, so that any Tx covariance matrix R = E {xx+} must
be in the following feasible set SR:
SR = {R ≥ 0 : tr(R) ≤ PT , tr(W3jR) ≤ PIj ∀j} (3)
where PT , PIj are the maximum allowed transmit and
interference powers at the Tx and each PR respectively, termed
here the TPC and IPC powers. The IPC
tr(W3jR) = tr(H3jRH
+
3j) ≤ PIj , j = 1, 2..K, (4)
ensures that the total interference power at the jth PR does not
exceed the IPC power PIj so that this PR’s performance is not
distorted. This type of interference constraints has been widely
adopted in the literature for regular systems (no secrecy)
[3][49]-[51] as well as for secrecy systems [18][23][27]-
[32]. In this multi-user environment, the secrecy capacity of
the interference-constrained WTC is defined operationally as
the largest achievable rate on the Tx-Rx link subject to the
secrecy, reliability, transmit and interference power constraints
simultaneously. Note that per-antenna power constraints (as in
e.g. [47][48]), in addition to or instead of the TPC, can also be
accommodated by setting some W3j to be diagonal matrices
with 0-1 entries.
A. Secrecy Capacity of Interference-Constrained MIMO WTC
Since the Evs are cooperative, their received signals can be
aggregated into a single vector resulting in a single meta-Ev
as follows:
y2 = H2x+ ξ2 (5)
where y2, H2 are aggregated received signals and channel
matrices, respectively, y2 = [y
+
21,y
+
22, ...,y
+
2N ]
+, H2 =
[H+21,H
+
22, ...,H
+
2N ]
+, ξ2 = [ξ
+
21, ξ
+
22, ..., ξ
+
2N ]
+. While the
MISO case was considered in [27], its approach cannot be
extended to the full MIMO case since an optimal covariance
is not necessarily of rank-1 and there is no equivalent scalar
channel allowing quasi-convex reformulation of the original
non-convex problem.
A different approach was adopted in [33]: it is based
on the max-min characterization of the secrecy capacity
originally developed in [8][9] under the TPC alone and
its further extension to the case of the joint constraints
(TPC+IPC). This established the operational secrecy capacity
of the interference-constrained MIMO WTC above as follows
(Gaussian signaling is still optimal in this setting).
Theorem 1. The operational secrecy capacity of interference-
constrained Gaussian MIMO WTC in (1), (5) and (2) under
the TPC and the IPCs in (3) can be expressed as
C = max
R∈SR
C(R) = max
R∈SR
min
K∈SK
f(R,K) (P1) (6)
where
C(R) = ln |I+W1R| − ln |I+W2R|, (7)
f(R,K) = ln |I+K−1HRH+| − ln |I+W2R|, (8)
5and H = [H+1 ,H
+
2 ]
+, SK is a set of noise covariance
matrices of the form
SK =
{
K : K =
[
I N
N+ I
]
,K ≥ 0
}
, (9)
where N = E{ξ1ξ+2 } is noise cross-covariance.
We emphasize that Theorem 1 characterizes the operational
secrecy capacity (the largest achievable secrecy rate) rather
than an information capacity defined formally as the difference
of two mutual information terms, as sometimes done in the
literature (without proving its operational significance). The
case of multiple non-cooperating Evs corresponds to a com-
pound WTC (see e.g. [21][22]) and is much more difficult for
analysis; its secrecy capacity is not known under interference
constraints in general (it is not even known whether Gaussian
signaling is optimal). The capacity above is a lower bound to
that of the non-cooperative case, since Evs cooperation, while
having no effect on the Rx error probability, cannot decrease
the information leakage and hence cannot increase the secrecy
capacity. However, if there exists a dominant Ev, as in [33,
Proposition 8], then Theorem 1 still holds, with W2 being
the channel Gram matrix of the dominant Ev.
Theorem 1 provides two equivalent characterizations of
the secrecy capacity: as a max problem or as a max-min
problem. While the first characterization appears to be easier
for numerical optimization and is indeed widely-used in the
existing literature [23]-[25], it makes it virtually impossible to
prove convergence to a global optimum since the max problem
is not convex (since C(R) is not concave, unless the channel
is degraded, see e.g. [8]), and hence its KKT conditions are
not sufficient for global optimality. Provable convergence to
a global optimum in this case is out of reach [35][44]-[46].
Here, we adopt a different approach based on the max-
min representation of the secrecy capacity in (6), denoted
below as (P1). While this representation involves 2 conflicting
optimizations, it is actually easier for numerical optimization,
since both optimizations are convex as f(R,K) is concave
in R for any fixed K and is convex in K for any fixed R
(see [8][12][33] for further details) and, hence, the respective
KKT conditions for both optimizations are jointly sufficient
for global optimality. This opens up a path to develop an iter-
ative algorithm, based on this representation, with a probable
convergence to a global (rather than local) optimum.
We caution the reader that while the optimal values of the
max and max-min problems in (6) are the same, the respective
optimal covariances are not necessarily the same, i.e. R∗ 6=
R′ and C = C(R∗) > C(R′) in those cases (see (34)-(38)
for an example), where R∗ and (R′,K′) are optimal points
of the max and max-min problem respectively,
R∗ = arg max
R∈SR
C(R),
(R′,K′) = arg max
R∈SR
min
K∈SK
f(R,K) (10)
In some (singular) cases, the difference can be significant (see
Fig. 5 and 8). This phenomenon never appears without IPCs
(under the TPC alone), as in [8][9][26], where both problems
always share the same optimal covariance matrix, R∗ = R′.
To address this issue, Algorithm 2 is developed in Section
IV, which computes iteratively an optimal covariance matrix
R∗ in these singular cases. Its convergence is also proved.
Finally, it should also be noted that R∗ is not necessarily
unique (see e.g. Example 2 in [34]), which motivates the
power minimization problem (P4) in (49).
III. CAPACITY-ACHIEVING SIGNALING UNDER
INTERFERENCE CONSTRAINTS
In this section, we propose an iterative algorithm to solve
(P1) numerically and prove its convergence to a global op-
timum. Performing separately max and min optimizations
in the max-min part of (6) immediately faces a serious and
fundamental difficulty of achieving or proving convergence
of the algorithm due to its oscillatory behaviour, which is
due to conflicting (max-min) optimization operations. To
overcome this difficulty, we use the residual form of Newton
method where both optimizations (max and min) are done
simultaneously, so that the residual of the KKT conditions
is reduced at each iteration and it converges monotonically to
zero as the algorithm progresses (see e.g. [35] for more details
on this general approach). This opens up a way to a provable
convergence to a global optimum, which is out of reach for
the max problem in (6) due to its non-convex nature.
We develop below an iterative algorithm, which is able
to handle any number of interference constraints and which
does not require advance knowledge of which constraint is
active and which is not. This algorithm is based on the max-
min representation of the secrecy capacity in (6) and includes
the barrier method, the residual-form Newton method and the
backtracking line search, see e.g. [35] for more details on these
algorithms. Unlike generic convex optimization algorithms or
solvers, our algorithm here is specifically tailored for secrecy
rate maximization in multi-user Gaussian MIMO WTC under
interference constraints. Its convergence to a global optimum
is rigorously proved, even when the WTC is not degraded and
hence the max problem in (6) is not convex. This is a distinct
advantage not found in other known algorithms, e.g. in [23]-
[25], where either no convergence at all is proved or where
only convergence to a stationary point is proved, which is not
necessarily a global maximum, as discussed above.
The key idea of the barrier method is to substitute the orig-
inal objective function f(R,K) by a modified one ft(R,K),
which includes additional barrier terms as follows:
ft(R,K) = f(R,K) + I1(R) + I2(R)
+
∑
j
I3j(R)− I4(K) (11)
where t > 0 is the barrier parameter and
I1(R) = t
−1 ln |R|, (12)
I2(R) = t
−1 ln(PT − tr(R)), (13)
I3j(R) = t
−1 ln(PIj − tr(W3jR)), (14)
I4(K) = t
−1 ln |K|. (15)
6so that all inequality constraints are absorbed in the respective
barrier terms I1 − I4. Note that the domain of ft(R,K) is
R ∈ S′R,K ∈ S′K where
S′R = {R ∈ SR : R > 0, tr(R) < PT , tr(W3j) < PIj},
S′K = {K ∈ SK : K > 0}, (16)
i.e. R, K are strictly inside of the original feasible sets
SR, SK (but may approach the boundary arbitrary closely
- this is a key feature of the barrier method). Note also that
ft(R,K) is convex-concave in the right way, i.e. concave inR
for any fixed K and convex in K for any fixed R, so that the
respective optimization problems are convex and their KKT
conditions are jointly sufficient for global optimality.
In the proposed algorithm, we use the residual-form Newton
method to compute an optimal point {R(t),K(t)} of (P2)
below for a fixed t in an iterative way and with high accuracy.
To facilitate implementation, we use real rather than complex
variables. To reduce the number of variables and improve the
efficiency, we exploit the symmetry of R and K and use
x = veh(R) and y = vec(N) as independent variables to
representR andK, where vec(N) operator stacks all columns
of N on top of each other and veh(R) does so for the lower-
triangular part of R. Since vec(N) is used as independent
variables to represent K, the equality constraint in (9) is
satisfied automatically. The original max-min problem (P1)
in (6) is transformed into the following unconstraint problem:
(P2) max
x
min
y
ft(R,K) (17)
so that its KKT conditions are simply the stationarity condi-
tions:
r(z) = ∇zft = 0 (18)
where
z =
[
x
y
]
, r(z) =
[∇xft
∇yft
]
(19)
are the aggregate vector of the variables and the residuals
respectively. In the residual-form Newton method, the opti-
mality condition r(z) = 0 is iteratively solved using 1st-order
approximation of r(z) at each step (which corresponds to the
second-order approximation of the objective):
r(zk +∆z) = r(zk) +Dr∆z + o(∆z) = 0. (20)
where zk and ∆z are the current variables and their updates
respectively at iteration k, and where Dr is the derivative of
r(z), i.e. the Hessian of ft(x,y):
Dr =
[∇2xxft ∇2xyft
∇2yxft ∇2yyft
]
. (21)
Closed-form expressions for gradients and Hessians are given
in the Appendix. By ignoring o(∆z), (20) can be reduced to
a system of linear equations in ∆z:
r(zk) +Dr∆z = 0 (22)
which can be solved numerically using any of the existing (and
efficient) techniques. When Hessian Dr is non-singular, ∆z
in (22) has a unique solution. In our case, the non-singularity
of Dr at each step of the Newton method is rigorously
established below. After computing∆z from (22), z is updated
as follows
zk+1 = zk + s∆z (23)
where k denotes the Newton iteration number (step) and where
s > 0 is the step size, which can be found via backtracking
line search (see e.g. [35] for a background on this method).
The Newton method in combination with the backtracking
line search is guaranteed to reduce the residual norm |r(z)| at
each step, which follows from the respective norm-reduction
property [35], so that for sufficiently small s, the residual norm
shrinks at each iteration approaching r(zk) = 0 as k increases.
After several iterations, the convergence becomes quadratic
(see [35] for related definitions and analysis) and hence very
fast, so that the optimal point (R(t),K(t)) of the problem
(17) can be approached with any desired accuracy in a small to
moderate number of steps. Following the barrier method, the
problem in (17) is solved for sequentially increasing t, where
the optimal point of the previous t serves as an initial point
for the new, increased t, thus minimizing the total number
of Newton iterations required [35]. It can be shown that
f(R(t),K(t)) → C as t → ∞ so that any desired accuracy
can be reached (see Proposition 2 below).
The proposed algorithm is shown below, where α is the
percentage of the linear decrease in the residual norm one is
willing to accept in the backtracking line search; β and η are
the parameters controlling reduction in step size s and increase
in barrier parameter t at each iteration of the respective loop of
the algorithm, ǫ is the target residual accuracy, t0 and tmax
are initial and maximum values of the barrier parameter; t
varies from t0 to tmax, where the latter controls the accuracy
of the barrier method so that the inaccuracy in the secrecy
capacity due to the barrier method does not exceed max{m+
1 + K,n1 + n2}/tmax. z0 = [xT0 ,yT0 ]T is an initial point
defined as follows
x0 = veh(PT I/a), y0 = 0
a = 2max{m, {tr(W3j)PT /PIj}}, (24)
so that R0 ∈ S′R,K0 ∈ S′K. Note that R0 represents
isotropic signaling satisfying all power constraints and K0
represents uncorrelated noise. Numerical experiments show
that this initial point results in fast convergence in all stud-
ied cases. While the barrier method generates a sequence
of {R(t),K(t)} which are strictly inside the feasible set
(e.g. non-singular), they may approach the boundary arbitrary
closely, thus representing a rank-deficient solution. In this
case, non-zero but very small eigenvalues of R(t) can be
rounded off to zero facilitating low-complexity (low-rank)
implementation, which includes beamforming as a special
case.
A. Analysis of Algorithm 1
In this section, we prove the convergence of Algorithm 1
to a globally-optimal solution of the problem in (6) using the
steps of the convergence analysis in [35] and adapting them
properly to the current setting. First, from the residual norm-
7Algorithm 1 (for optimal secure signaling under interference
constraints)
Require z0, 0 < α < 0.5, 0 < β < 1, tmax > t0 > 0,
η > 1, ǫ > 0.
1. Set t = t0; compute r(z0) via (19).
repeat (barrier method)
2. Set k = 0.
repeat (Newton method)
3. Compute the Hessian matrix Dr via (21).
4. Compute update ∆z via (22).
5. Set s = 1.
repeat (backtracking line search)
6. s := βs.
7. Update zk+1 = zk + s∆z; compute r(zk+1)
until |r(zk+1)| 6 (1 − αs)|r(zk)| and Rk+1 ∈
S′R,Kk+1 ∈ S′K
8. k := k + 1.
until |r(zk)| 6 ǫ
9. Compute f(Rk,Kk), C(Rk).
10. Set z0 := zk as a new starting point.
11. Update t := ηt.
until t > tmax
12. Output: (Rk,Kk), f(Rk,Kk), C(Rk).
reduction property of the Newton method (see Sec. 10.3 in
[35]),
d
ds
|r(zk + s∆z)| = −|r(zk)| ≤ 0 (25)
so that the termination condition of the backtracking line
search in Algorithm 1 is satisfied for a sufficiently-small
s > 0,
|r(zk + s∆z)| = (1− s)|r(zk)|+ o(s) ≤ (1 − αs)|r(zk)|
(26)
where 0 < α < 0.5, and hence
|r(zk+1)| ≤ |r(zk)| (27)
so that {|r(zk)|} is a decreasing sequence that converges
(since it is bounded from below by 0); from (25), a conver-
gence point is 0 (otherwise, |r(z)| could be further reduced
as the inequality in (27) is strict if |r(zk)| > 0), i.e. to a point
that solves the KKT conditions. This point is globally-optimal
since the KKT conditions are sufficient for global optimality
of (P2) due to the convex-concave nature of ft(R,K), as
explained above.
It remains to show that, (i) at each step of the Newton
method, (22) can be solved to obtain update ∆z, and that
(ii) ft(R(t),K(t)) will approach f(R
′,K′) = C arbitrary
closely as t increases, where (R′,K′) is an optimal (saddle)
point of (P1).
To establish first point, it is sufficient to show that the
Hessian Dr is non-singular at each Newton step
Proposition 1. Consider the max-min problem (P2) in (17).
Its Hessian Dr as defined in (21) is non-singular for each
t > 0, R ∈ S′R,K ∈ S′K.
Proof. See Appendix.
In fact, Proposition 1 ensures that the update equation (22)
has a unique solution at each Newton step. To demonstrate
second point, we give below a sub-optimality bound for the
barrier method, from which it follows that f(R(t),K(t)) →
C as t→∞.
Proposition 2. For each t > 0, the gap of the barrier method
used in (17) can be upper bounded as follows:
|f(R(t),K(t)) − C| ≤ max(mR, nK)/t (28)
whereR(t),K(t) are the optimal signal and noise covariance
matrices returned by the barrier method for a given t; nK =
n1 + n2, mR = m+ 1 +K and K is the number of IPCs.
Proof. To establish the bound, consider first the min part of
(P1) in (6) for a fixed R = R(t) > 0 and use the analysis
of the barrier method in Sec. 11.6 of [35] to obtain an upper
bound:
f(R(t),K(t)) ≤ min
K∈SK
f(R(t),K) + nK/t
≤ max
R∈SR
min
K∈SK
f(R,K) + nK/t (29)
where nK = n1 + n2 accounts for the constraint K ≥ 0.
Consider now the max part of (P1) for a fixed K = K(t) > 0
and use the same approach to obtain
f(R(t),K(t)) ≥ max
R∈SR
f(R,K(t))−mR/t
≥ min
K∈SK
max
R∈SR
f(R,K)−mR/t (30)
where mR = m+ 1 +K; m accounts for the positive semi-
definite constraint R ≥ 0, while 1 and K account for the
TPC and IPC respectively. Combining these two bounds, one
obtains
C −mR/t ≤ f(R(t),K(t)) ≤ C + nK/t (31)
from which (28) follows, where we have used the saddle-point
property of the problem (P1):
C = min
K∈SK
max
R∈SR
f(R,K) = max
R∈SR
min
K∈SK
f(R,K) (32)
which follows from Von Neumann mini-max theorem [33].
Note that the original objective f(R,K) is used in (28), not
the modified one ft. The bound in (28) can be used in practice
to set up tmax to meet a target accuracy ∆C in terms of the
achieved secrecy rate f(R(t),K(t)): if |C−f(R(t),K(t))| ≤
∆C is needed, then setting
tmax ≥ max(mR, nK)/∆C (33)
will satisfy this requirement.
IV. OPTIMAL COVARIANCE IN THE SINGULAR CASE
Algorithm 1 can be used to evaluate the secrecy capacity
in the general case by evaluating numerically f(R′,K′) = C
at saddle point (R′,K′) (i.e. the optimal point of the max-
min problem (P1) in (6)). However, R′ is not necessarily an
optimizer of C(R), i.e. not an optimal Tx covariance R∗ =
argmaxR∈SR C(R), so that C(R
′) < C(R∗) = f(R′,K′)
is possible. This happens when the TPC is inactive and,
8for all active IPCs, the sum
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j+W3j is singular (i.e. the
intersection of their null spaces is not empty). The following
example [33] illustrates this point. Let
H1 = diag{1, 0}, H2 = diag{0, 1}, W3 = diag{1, 0}
(34)
It is straightforward to see that the saddle-point (R′,K′) is
K′ = I, R′ = diag{min(PT , PI), a} (35)
where a is any in the interval 0 ≤ a ≤ (PT − PI)+, so that
R′ is not unique if PT > PI . The optimal covariance is
R∗ = diag{min(PT , PI), 0} (36)
Thus, R∗ 6= R′ (unless a = 0) and
C = f(R′,K′) = ln(1 + min(PT , PI)) (37)
for any a. However, if one sets a = (PT − PI)+, then
C(R′) = ln
1 + min(PT , PI)
1 + (PT − PI)+ < C = C(R
∗) (38)
where the inequality holds if PT > PI (negative C(R
′) is
interpreted as zero rate). Hence, R′ is not an optimal transmit
covariance R∗ (one maximizing the secrecy rate C(R)). We
conclude that while the application of Algorithm 1 is possible
to find the secrecy capacity via C = f(R′,K′), it cannot be
used to findR∗ in the singular case, sinceR′ 6= R∗ is possible
and, furthermore, C(R′) < C = C(R∗) is also possible (as
a side remark, we note that this effect disappears if the IPCs
are removed, since the TPC is always active in this case).
Therefore, the singular case needs special treatment to
establish an optimal signaling strategy (optimal covariance),
not just the capacity. This is done below via Algorithm 2,
which incorporates Algorithm 1 and bisection search to find
an optimal covariance as well as the least Tx power required
to achieve the secrecy capacity (this may be smaller than the
TPC power PT in the singular case).
To this end, let C(PT ) be the secrecy capacity as a function
of TPC power PT , with all interference constraint powers
being fixed, and let
P0 = min{P : C(PT ) ≤ C(P ) ∀PT ≥ 0} (39)
so that C(PT ) ≤ C(P0) ∀PT ≥ 0, i.e. C(PT ) saturates
at C(P0) as PT increases; P0 = ∞ corresponds to no
saturation. It follows from the definition of P0 that PT,min =
min{PT , P0} is the minimum Tx power required to achieve
the capacity C(PT ). Note that PT,min < PT if PT > P0,
i.e. Tx power saving is possible and hence it is important to
evaluate P0 as well.
The following general properties of the function C(PT )
are needed below to construct an algorithm and to prove its
convergence. To the best of our knowledge, these properties
of the secrecy capacity never appeared in the literature before,
even without interference constraints. We will assume below
that C(P0) > 0, i.e. C(PT ) is not identically 0 for all PT
(which would be the case for a reversely-degraded channel).
Proposition 3. Let C(P0) > 0. The secrecy capacity C(PT )
as a function of TPC power PT (under fixed PIj) has the
following properties:
1. C(PT ) is a non-decreasing function of PT ; strictly-
increasing for any PT < P0.
2. C(PT ) is a concave, continuous function of PT .
3. If C(PT ) = C(P1) for some P1 > PT , then this holds for
any P1 > PT . Equivalently, if C(PT )
′
+ = 0, then C(P1)
′
+ = 0
for any P1 > PT , where C(PT )
′
+ is the right derivative;
additionally, C(PT )
′
+ = 0 for any PT ≥ P0.
4. If C(P1) < C(PT ) for some P1, then C(P2) < C(P1)
for any P2 < P1. Equivalently, if C(PT )
′
− > 0, then
C(P1)
′
− > 0 for any P1 < PT , , where C(PT )
′
− is the left
derivative; additionally, C(PT )
′
− > 0 for any PT ≤ P0, i.e.
C(PT ) is strictly increasing for any PT < P0.
Proof. See Appendix
Thus, C(PT ) is concave, non-decreasing, and strictly-
increasing for PT < P0. The rate of increase slows down
with PT . Note that for PT > P0, the capacity C(PT ) can be
achieved with smaller Tx power P0. We will need below the
following result to deal with the singular case.
Proposition 4. Let µ(PT ) be a Lagrange multiplier, as a
function of TPC power PT , responsible for the TPC in (P1).
Then, µ(PT ) > 0 for any PT < P0, i.e. the TPC is always
active below P0, and µ(PT ) = 0 for any PT > P0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Based on this Proposition, we are now able to construct
an iterative algorithm to evaluate optimal covariance in the
singular case numerically with any desired accuracy. The key
idea for the PT ≥ P0 case (which is necessary for singularity)
is to identify the saturation point P0 and to apply Algorithm 1
with TPC power P slightly less than P0 (so that µ(P ) > 0 and
hence the TPC is active thus avoiding the singularity in this
way), which achieves the secrecy rate arbitrary close to the
capacity C(PT ) = C(P0) as P approaches P0 from below,
and gives a covariance matrix achieving this secrecy rate as
well.
Algorithm 2 (optimal signaling in the singular case)
Require δ, ǫ
1. Compute C = f(R′,K′) using Algorithm 1 for a given
PT .
2. Set Pmin = 0, Pmax = PT , P = PT /2.
3. Compute f(R′,K′) under new TPC tr(R) ≤ P using
Algorithm 1.
repeat (bisection search)
4. If f(R′,K′) < (1 − ǫ)C, set Pmin = P ; otherwise,
set Pmax = P .
5. Set P = (Pmin + Pmax)/2.
6. Compute f(R′,K′) under TPC tr(R) ≤ P using
Algorithm 1.
until Pmax − Pmin 6 δPT
7. Compute f(R′,K′) under TPC tr(R) ≤ Pmin using
Algorithm 1.
8. OutputR′, C(R′), ∆C = C−C(R′), PT,min = Pmin,
∆P = Pmax − Pmin.
Algorithm 2 returns nearly-optimal covariance R′ as well
as its achieved secrecy rate C(R′) and its distance ∆C to
9the secrecy capacity C. In addition, the algorithm returns
an approximate value of PT,min = min{PT , P0}, i.e. the
minimum Tx power required to achieve C(PT ), as well as
its accuracy ∆P . Note that ∆C and ∆P can be made as
small as necessary by setting sufficiently small δ and ǫ (this
follows from the continuity of all functions involved as well
as the compactness of the feasible set for any finite PT , in
addition to the nature of the bisection).
The condition in Line 4 is set to account for numerical
imprecision effects in computing f(R′,K′). While in theory
one can set ǫ = 0, this can result in numerical instability in
practice in some cases. Typical values of ǫ range between
10−2 (1% accuracy) to 10−6; δ controls the accuracy of
computed PT,min and δ = 10
−2 corresponds to 1% accuracy
with respect to PT .
A. Analysis of Algorithm 2
Here we provide a convergence analysis of Algorithm 2
to justify the claims above. To simplify the discussion, we
consider first the case of ǫ = 0 and neglect the numerical im-
precision effects (in particular, the imprecision of Algorithm 1,
whose accuracy can be very high even for a small number of
Newton steps), which is a standard assumption in the literature
(see e.g. convergence analysis in [35]). The convergence of
sufficiently small but non-zero ǫ > 0 will follow from the
continuity of all functions involved.
Let Pmin,k, Pmax,k and Pk be the power values set in Line
4 and 5 of Algorithm 2, i.e. at k-th iteration of the bisection.
Note that, due to the nature of the bisection, ∆k = Pmax,k −
Pmin,k is reduced by a factor of 2 at each step, so that
∆k = PT /2
k (40)
The following proposition gives further important properties.
Proposition 5. The following holds at k-th iteration of the
bisection in Algorithm 2 with ǫ = 0:
Pmin,k < Pk < Pmax,k ≤ PT (41)
and {Pmin,k}, {Pmax,k} are monotonically increasing and
decreasing sequences, respectively. If PT ≥ P0, then
Pmin,k < P0 ≤ Pmax,k ≤ PT (42)
If PT < P0, then
Pmin,k = PT (1− 2−k), Pmax,k = PT (43)
Proof. To prove first two inequalities in (41), use Pk =
(Pmin,k + Pmax,k)/2 and ∆k > 0 for any k. The last
inequality is by construction of the algorithm, i.e. from
Pmax,0 = PT and Pmax,k+1 ≤ Pmax,k, which follows from
the fact that either Pmax,k+1 = Pmax,k or Pmax,k+1 =
Pk < Pmax,k. Likewise, Pmin,k+1 ≥ Pmin,k , since either
Pmin,k+1 = Pmin,k or Pmin,k+1 = Pk > Pmin,k.
First inequality in (42) follows from Line 4 (with ǫ = 0),
which implies that Pmin,k = P iff f(R
′,K′) = C(P ) < C =
C(P0) so that, from the monotonically-increasing property of
C(P ) in Proposition 3 and the initial condition Pmin,0 = 0,
Pmin,k < P0. second inequality in (42) is established in a
similar way.
If PT < P0, then Pmax,k = PT , since f(R
′,K′) =
C(P ) = C = C(PT ) implies P = PT , from the
monotonically-increasing property of C(P ) in Proposition 3,
and the initial condition is Pmax,0 = PT . First equality in
(43) follows from second and ∆k = PT /2
k.
Since ∆k → 0 as k → ∞, it follows from Proposition 5
that
Pmin,k, Pmax,k, Pk → min{PT , P0} = PT,min (44)
so that the minimum required power PT,min can be evaluated
with any desired accuracy. Furthermore, the inaccuracy does
not exceed ∆k and, since ∆k = PT /2
k, the convergence
is exponentially fast, so that very few steps are required in
practice to achieve high accuracy. The number kδ of steps
needed to achieve the target accuracy δPT is, from∆k ≤ δPT ,
kδ =
⌈
log2
1
δ
⌉
(45)
Further note that Line 7 of Algorithm 2 evaluates R′ under
tr(R) ≤ Pmin,kδ < P0, where kδ is the total number
of bisections, so that µ(Pmin,kδ ) > 0 under this condition
(since, from Proposition 4, µ(P ) > 0 if P < P0) and hence
f(R′,K′) = C(R′) = C(Pmin,kδ ), i.e. R
′ is a maximizer
of C(R) as well under the TPC power Pmin,kδ . From the
continuity of C(P ), C(Pmin,kδ ) → C(PT ) as kδ → ∞, or
equivalently, ∆C → 0 as δ → 0, i.e. arbitrary high accuracy
can be achieved in terms of the secrecy rate as well, with
exponentially-fast convergence.
The case of non-zero ǫ > 0 can be considered in a similar
albeit more technical way. Let C−1(·) be the inverse function
of C(P ) and
P0ǫ = C
−1((1 − ǫ)C(P0)) (46)
so that C(P0ǫ) = (1 − ǫ)C(P0). The same steps as in the
proof of Proposition 5 can be used to establish (41)-(42) with
P0ǫ in place of P0. Eq. (43) applies as long as Pmin,k <
PTǫ = C
−1((1 − ǫ)C(PT )), after which (42) applies with
PTǫ in place of P0. Note that P0ǫ < P0, PTǫ < PT , and
P0ǫ → P0, PTǫ → PT as ǫ→ 0, so that similar accuracy and
performance is expected for sufficiently small but non-zero ǫ.
V. DUAL PROBLEMS
Motivated by the energy efficiency issues (green com-
munications, battery life etc.), one is lead to consider the
following problem dual of (6), which is to minimize globally
the total Tx power subject to the secrecy and interference
power constraints:
(P3) min
(P,R)
P s.t. (P,R) ∈ S3 (47)
where the feasible set S3 is
S3 = {(P,R) : C(R) ≥ C0, R ≥ 0, tr(R) ≤ P,
tr(W3jR) ≤ PIj} (48)
and C0 is the target secrecy rate and C(R) ≥ C0 is the secrecy
constraint. Note that this problem is not convex in general,
since C(R) is not concave (unless the channel is degraded),
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and, hence, powerful tools of convex optimization cannot be
used to solve it numerically (i.e. to find a global optimum).
In addition to this problem, since an optimal covariance
R∗ of the max problem in (6) is not necessarily unique (see
e.g. Example 2 in [34]), a new problem emerges: among all
optimal covariances R∗, find one with the least trace (i.e. the
minimum Tx power):
(P4) min
R∈S∗
1
tr(R) (49)
where S∗1 is the set of all optimal covariances R
∗ of the max
problem in (6). Since an explicit characterization of this set is
not known in the general case (it is not even known whether
this set is convex), standard optimization tools (including
convex optimization) seem to be inapplicable, making this
problem difficult for a direct attack.
The following Proposition shows that these problems have
identical solutions and that Algorithm 2 solves both of them.
Proposition 6. Let P3 and P4 be the optimal values of (P3)
and (P4), and let C0 be the optimal value of (P1), i.e. C0 =
C(PT ). Then,
P3 = P4 = min{PT , P0},
R∗3 = R
∗
4, C(R
∗
3) = C(R
∗
4) = C(PT ) (50)
where R∗3,R
∗
4 are optimal covariances of (P3) and (P4). If
PT ≥ P0, then P3 = P4 = P0 and Algorithm 2 also solves
(P3) and (P4). If PT < P0, then R
∗
3 = R
∗
4 = R
∗ = R′ and
P3 = P4 = PT (Algorithm 1 is sufficient, Algorithm 2 is not
necessary in this case).
Proof. First, we show that P3 = P4 if C0 = C(PT ). Indeed,
it follows from (48) that (PT ,R
∗) ∈ S3. Hence,
P3 ≤ PT , tr(R∗3) ≤ P3 ≤ PT , C(R∗3) ≥ C(PT ) (51)
which implies that R∗3 ∈ SR so that C(R∗3) ≤ C(PT ). There-
fore, C(R∗3) = C(PT ), i.e R
∗
3 is also optimal for the max
problem in (6): R∗3 ∈ S∗1 . This implies tr(R∗3) = P3 ≥ P4.
To show the opposite inequality, note that
C(R∗4) = C(PT ) = C0, tr(R
∗
4) = P4 (52)
and hence (P4,R
∗
4) ∈ S3 so that P3 ≤ P4. Therefore,
P3 = P4, as required. This also implies that R
∗
4 is optimal
for (P3) (since tr(R∗4) = P3) and that R
∗
3 is optimal for
(P4) (since tr(R∗3) = P4), i.e. R
∗
3 = R
∗
4 and hence problems
(P3) and (P4) have identical optimal values and optimal points
(covariances). This establishes (50)2.
To establish P3 = P4 = P0 if PT ≥ P0, observe that
C(P ) < C(P0) = C(PT ) = C0 for any P < P0 (from
(39)). Therefore, P3 = P4 ≥ P0. Since C(P0) = C(PT ) =
C(P3) = C(P4), it follows that P3 = P4 = P0 and hence
Algorithm 2 also solves (P3) and (P4).
If PT < P0 (which includes P0 = ∞), it follows from
Proposition 4 that the TPC is active and, from Proposition 3,
that C(PT ) is strictly increasing, which implies P3 = P4 =
PT andR
∗
3 = R
∗
4 = R
∗ = R′, where the last equality implies
that Algorithm 1 also solves (P3) and (P4).
2We caution the reader that this does not imply that R∗ = R∗
3
since R∗
is not necessarily unique and there may exist one with tr(R∗) > P3 = P4.
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Fig. 2. Convergence of the Newton method for different values of t; PT = 5
dB, PI1 = PI2 = 2 dB, α = 0.3, β = 0.5, channel matrices are as in (53).
VI. NUMERICAL EXPERIMENTS
To validate the algorithms and demonstrate their perfor-
mance, extensive numerical experiments have been carried
out. We consider below some representative cases with 2
cooperative Evs and 2 PRs below, for both deterministic and
randomly-generated channels.
Example 1: Fig. 2 illustrates the convergence of Algorithm
1 for the channel in (53), i.e. the residual’s Euclidian norm
|r(zk)| versus the number k of Newton steps for various
values of t. Channel matrices H1, H21, H22, H31, H32 are
set as follows:
H1 =
[
0.32 0.66
1.24 0.58
]
H21 =
[−0.58 −1.15
−0.37 −1.07
]
, H22 =
[
0.17 0.73
−0.07 −0.54
]
H31 =
[
1.47 0.32
−1.57 0.01
]
, H32 =
[−0.83 0.38
1.16 −0.86
]
(53)
so thatW31 andW32 are full rank (and hence the singularity
is ruled out so that R′ = R∗ in this case); the corresponding
eigenvalues ofW1−W2 are (−2.53, 1.16), i.e. the channel is
non-degraded and ”hard” for optimization (since the negative
eigenmode is dominant). For all considered values of t, it
takes only about 8 to 23 Newton steps to reach the machine
precision level (around 10−12; recall that a globally-optimal
point corresponds to |r| = 0). Also note the presence of two
convergence phases: linear and quadratic. After the quadratic
(”water-fall”) phase is reached, the convergence is very fast.
In general, higher values of t, which provide smaller gap to
the capacity, require more steps to achieve the same precision,
even though moderately so.
Fig. 3 shows the achieved secrecy rate C(R(t)) and its
upper bound f(R(t),K(t)) under the same setting as in Fig.
2. While the attained secrecy rate and the upper bound do con-
verge to the secrecy capacity, the convergence is significantly
non-monotonic here, unlike that in Fig. 2, where the residual
is decreasing monotonically. It takes more steps for C(R(t))
to converge, as compared to f(R(t),K(t)), since the former
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Fig. 3. Achieved secrecy rate C(R(t)) and the upper bound f(R(t),K(t))
for the same setting as in Fig. 2, via Algorithm 1 (for given t) and stochastic
Monte-Carlo (MC) search.
is much more sensitive to R than the latter (due to the strong
negative eigenmode ofW1−W2). While t = 103 is sufficient
to evaluate accurately the capacity via f(R(t),K(t)), it takes
t = 105 to get the same accuracy via C(R(t)) so we conclude
that, in addition to being convex-concave in the right way,
f(R(t),K(t)) is more robust (less sensitive) than C(R):
while using t = 103 entails no visible loss in precision for the
capacity estimate via f(R(t),K(t)), it induces a significant
loss (of about 50%) in attained secrecy rate C(R(t)).
For properly selected t, it takes a moderate number of 10
to 15 Newton steps for the algorithm to converge in terms of
achieved secrecy rates. In general, the numerical complexity
of Algorithm 1 follows that of the standard barrier method
[35]: the number of Newton steps for each value of t scales
as
O
(√
nv ln
1
ǫ
)
(54)
while the number of flops for each Newton step scales
as O(n3v) so that the overall number of flops scales as
O(n3v
√
nv ln ǫ
−1), i.e. polynomially in nv and logarithmically
in ǫ, where nv is the number of independent variables of the
max-min problem:
nv =
m(m+ 1)
2
+ n1
∑
j
n2j (55)
This should be contrasted with the complexity of the non-
convex max problem in (6): if the global optimum is found
using a generic non-convex optimization algorithm, the com-
plexity scales as
O
(
(1/ǫ)
n′
v
)
, n′v = m(m+ 1)/2, (56)
i.e. exponentially large in n′v, see e.g. [45][46], – a stark
contrast to (54), which scales sub-polynomially in nv .
We further remark that while higher values of t result in
higher precision for the achieved secrecy rate C(R(t)), they
also require more steps to reach the same precision level ǫ,
even though this number is still moderate.
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Fig. 4. Achieved secrecy rates C(R′) and f(R′,K′) via Algorithm 1 and
extensive MC search, averaged over 200 randomly-generated channels with 2
Evs and 2 PRs; PI1 = PI2 = 2 dB, ǫ = 10
−8, δ = 10−3 , α = 0.3, β =
0.5, η = 5, tmin = 102, tmax = 105 .
Algorithm 1 was further validated by comparing its
achieved secrecy rates with those attained by extensive
stochastic Monte-Carlo (MC) search (where a large number,
e.g. 105, of covariance matrices were randomly generated
within the feasible set and the best one was selected as an
optimal covariance). As Fig. 3 shows, these two methods agree
well with each other.
Example 2: To further validate Algorithm 1, its perfor-
mance was evaluated on 200 randomly-generated channels
(from i.i.d.N(0, 1) distribution for each entry of each channel)
with different numbers of antennas. No significant difference
with Fig. 2 and 3 was found. The number of Newton steps to
reach the same precision is somewhat larger for larger number
of antennas but only moderately so, in agreement with (54).
Fig. 4 shows the averaged secrecy rates found via Algorithm
1 (i.e. C(R′) and f(R′,K′)) as well as via extensive MC
search, for different numbers of antennas at each node, with
2 Evs and 2 PRs present at each setting. Clearly, the results
of Algorithm 1 and MC search agree well with each other,
thus validating Algorithm 1.
Example 3: In this example, we demonstrate that while
max
R∈SR
C(R) = max
R∈SR
min
K∈SK
f(R,K) (57)
as Theorem 1 indicates,R′, which is a maximizer of f(R,K),
may not be a maximizer of C(R), i.e. it is not necessarily an
optimal covariance R∗ attaining the secrecy capacity, R∗ 6=
R′, as discussed above. In fact, the difference can be quite
significant. Let the channel matrices be as follows: H1, H21,
H22 as in (53), and set
H31 =
[−0.23 −0.16
−0.05 −0.71
]
, H32 =
[−0.47 0.09] (58)
so thatW31 is full rank andW32 is rank deficient and hence
the singular case is possible. It is clear from Fig. 5 that R′
is not a maximizer of C(R) in the singular case, i.e. for
PT larger than about 11 dB (which corresponds to inactive
TPC and the active IPC channel matrix being singular) where
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Fig. 5. Secrecy rate as a function of the TPC power PT for H1, H21 , H22
as in (53) while H31 and H32 are as in (58), PI1 = PI2 = 5 dB. Note
that R′ is not always a maximizer of C(R) but the secrecy rate attained
by Algorithm 2 always agrees well with that of MC and f(R′,K′). Taylor-
based algorithm gets trapped at a local optimum, far away from the global
one, since the channel is not degraded.
C(R′) drops down significantly while f(R′,K′) returned
by Algorithm 1 is always a good estimate of the capacity.
Hence, R′ cannot be used for optimal signaling as an optimal
covariance under inactive TPC (this would entail about 70%
loss in achieved secrecy rate). Note also that Algorithm 2 is
able to find an optimal covariance even in the singular case
and its attained secrecy rate agrees well with that of extensive
Monte-Carlo search and that via f(R′,K′).
To demonstrate that sub-optimal algorithms (based on 1st
order Taylor expansion of the non-convex part of the max
problem) may get trapped at a local optimum that is far away
from the global one, the secrecy rate maximization algorithm
in [25], which is based on this strategy, was implemented
using the popular convex optimization toolbox CVX [52]
in each iteration. As Fig. 5 shows, it does get trapped in
a local optimum (close to 0), far away from the global
one, as expected from the discussion in the Introduction.
Hence, Taylor-based sub-optimal algorithms should be used
with caution (or avoided at all) when the original problem
is not convex (as in this example, where the channel is not
degraded and negative eigenmode dominates, making it ”hard”
for optimization).
Fig. 6 demonstrates the convergence of Algorithm 2 for the
setting of Fig. 5 with PT = 100 (20 dB), PI1 = PI2 = 3.16
(5 dB); ǫ = δ = 10−4. Note that the convergence is
exponentially fast so that only a few bisection steps is needed
and that both sequences converge monotonically to P0 =
14.09. Fig. 7 shows the convergence of attained secrecy rates
C(R′(Pmin,k)) and C(R
′(Pmax,k)) for the same setting.
Note that C(R′(Pmax,k)) is initially significantly below the
capacity while f(R′(Pmax,k),K
′(Pmax,k)) = C = 2.17
for all k, confirming our earlier observation that R′ is not
necessarily a maximizer of C(R) while f(R′,K′) = C al-
ways holds. Algorithm 2 overcomes this problem by properly
reducing the TPC power PT to make the TPC active. In this
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Fig. 6. Convergence of Algorithm 2 for the setting of Fig. 5; PT = 100 (20
dB), PI1 = PI2 = 3.16 (5 dB); ǫ = δ = 10
−4; estimated P0 = 14.09.
Note that the difference between Pmax,k and Pmin,k decreases sharply with
k and both sequences monotonically converge to P0, as expected from the
analysis.
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Fig. 7. Convergence of secrecy rates from Algorithm 2 for the set-
ting of Fig. 6. Note that both C(R′(Pmin,k)) and C(R
′(Pmax,k))
converge to the capacity, where the former converges faster while
f(R′(Pmax,k),K
′(Pmax,k)) = C for all k, as expected.
process, both C(R′(Pmin,k)) and C(R
′(Pmax,k)) converge to
the capacity, where the former converges faster (it takes only
6 iterations) while f(R′(Pmax,k),K
′(Pmax,k)) = C for all k,
as expected from the analysis. As a by-product, the minimum
Tx power P0 = 14.09 needed to achieve the secrecy capacity
C = 2.17 is also determined by Algorithm 2. Note that this
power is significantly smaller than the TPC power PT = 100,
hence allowing significant power savings.
Example 4: To further validate Algorithm 2, we compare
its performance with that of MC search for 200 randomly-
generated channels for which the singularity condition of Sec-
tion IV is satisfied, with m = n1 = 4, n21 = n22 = 3, n31 =
n32 = 2. Fig. 8 shows the respective averaged secrecy rates.
Note that the results of Algorithm 2 and MC search agree
well with each other while using R′ from Algorithm 1 alone
does not always maximize C(R), in agreement with Section
IV and Example 3; the gap is significant at high PT (e.g.
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Fig. 8. Secrecy rate vs. the TPC power PT , averaged over 200 random
realizations of singular channels; PI1 = PI2 = −2 dB, ǫ = 10
−4, δ =
10−3, α = 0.3, β = 0.5, η = 5, tmin = 102, tmax = 105. Note
that R′ is not always a maximizer of C(R) but the secrecy rate attained by
Algorithm 2 always agrees well with that of MC search and f(R′,K′).
10 dB). This shows a dramatic impact of IPC on algorithm’s
performance. This figure, along with Fig. 5, also shows that
Algorithm 1 alone is not sufficient and Algorithm 2 is really
needed to find an optimal covariance matrix in the singular
case. On the contrary, Algorithm 1 is sufficient to find the
capacity in the general case via f(R′,K′).
VII. CONCLUSION
Optimal secure signaling over multi-user MIMO wiretap
channels has been studied under interference constraints (e.g.
as in CR) in this paper. While several algorithms have been
presented in the literature for secrecy rate maximization in
this setting, they are either limited to the MISO setting
(single-antenna receiver) or suffer from the lack of provable
convergence to a global optimum and may get trapped in a
local optimum far away from the global one.
In this paper, we presented two algorithms for global
secrecy rate maximization under interference constraints in the
full multi-user MIMO setting with provable (global) conver-
gence to the secrecy capacity. These algorithms avoid using
approximation-based approach (as in all known algorithms)
and hence avoid the danger of being trapped in a local
optimum (or stationary point) far away from the global one.
This is accomplished by using the recent secrecy capacity
characterization in the interference-constrained setting as a
max-min problem, where both problems are convex. As a
by-product, the minimum transmit power needed to achieve
the secrecy capacity is also determined via Algorithm 2. This
algorithm also solves the dual problem of globally minimizing
the total Tx power subject to the secrecy rate constraint,
in addition to the IPCs. Numerical experiments validate the
convergence analysis and demonstrate fast convergence for
both algorithms as well as their superiority to the sub-optimal
algorithms known in the literature.
Finally, we remark that these algorithms can also be used to
evaluate the secrecy capacity and globally-optimal signaling
strategy under per-antenna power constraint, in addition to or
instead of the TPC. This can be accomplished by setting some
W3j to be diagonal matrices with 0-1 entries.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Gradients and Hessians
While gradients and Hessians can be computed numerically
via finite differences, this results in lower efficiency in addi-
tion to a possible loss in precision (due to numerical ”noise”),
which affects negatively convergence of the algorithm. Hence,
we provide below analytical expressions for gradients and
Hessians obtained, after some manipulations, using the stan-
dard rules of matrix differential calculus (see e.g. [36][37]):
∇xft = DTmvec(Z1 − Z2 + t−1R−1)
− 1
t
g1(R)veh(I)− 1
t
∑
j
g3j(R)wj ,
∇yft = D˜Tnvec((K+Q)−1 − (1 + t−1)K−1) (59)
where Q = HRHT , wj = veh(2W3j − diag(W3j)),
g1(R) = (PT − tr(R))−1,
g3j(R) = (PIj − tr(W3jR))−1,
Z1 = (I+H
TK−1HR)−1HTK−1H,
Z2 = (I+W2R)
−1W2, (60)
and Dm is the m
2 ×m(m+1)/2 duplication matrix defined
from vec(R) = Dmveh(R) [37], D˜n is (n1 + n2)
2 × n1n2
reduced duplication matrix defined from dk = D˜ndk˜, where
dk = vec(dK), dk˜ = vec(dN), dK =
(
0 dNT
dN 0
)
Likewise, the Hessians are
∇2xxft = −DTm(Z1 ⊗ Z1 − Z2 ⊗ Z2 + t−1R−1 ⊗R−1)Dm
− 1
t
g1(R)
2veh(I)veh(I)T − 1
t
∑
j
g3j(R)
2wjw
T
j
∇2xyft = −DTm(HT (K+Q)−1 ⊗HT (K+Q)−1)D˜n
∇2yyft = D˜Tn (−(K+Q)−1 ⊗ (K+Q)−1
+ (1 + t−1)K−1 ⊗K−1)D˜n (61)
B. Proof of Proposition 1
The proof is based on the following two Lemmas.
Lemma 1. Partial Hessian ∇2xxft, ∇2yyft are non-singular
for each t > 0, R ∈ S′R,K ∈ S′K.
Proof. First, since Q ≥ 0 and K > 0, then K+Q ≥ K > 0
so that
(K+Q)−1 ≤ K−1 (62)
and, using the properties of Kronecker products [38],
K−1 ⊗K−1 ≥ (K+Q)−1 ⊗ (K+Q)−1 (63)
so that
(1 + t−1)K−1 ⊗K−1 − (K+Q)−1 ⊗ (K+Q)−1
≥ t−1K−1 ⊗K−1 > 0. (64)
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Secondly, since D˜n is of full column rank, it follows that
D˜ny 6= 0 for any y 6= 0, so that
yT∇2yyfty = yT D˜Tn ((1 + t−1)K−1 ⊗K−1
− (K+Q)−1 ⊗ (K+Q)−1)D˜ny > 0 (65)
where the inequality is due to (64), and thus ∇2yyft > 0, as
required.
To prove the non-singularity of ∇2xxft, first note that
HTK−1H ≥W2 so that (HTK−1H)−1 ≤W−12 and hence
Z1 ≥ Z2 as follows:
Z1 = (I+H
TK−1HR)−1HTK−1H
= (R+ (HTK−1H)−1)−1
≥ (R+W−12 )−1
= (I+W2R)
−1W2 = Z2. (66)
The case of singular HTK−1H and W2 can be considered
using the standard continuity argument (see e.g. [38]). Using
this equality and the property of Kronecker products, it fol-
lows that Z1⊗Z1 ≥ Z2⊗Z2, and, since t−1R−1⊗R−1 > 0,
Z1 ⊗ Z1 − Z2 ⊗ Z2 + t−1R−1 ⊗R−1 > 0 (67)
Since Dm is of full column rank [37], Dmy 6= 0 for any
y 6= 0, so that
yTDTm(Z1 ⊗ Z1 − Z2 ⊗ Z2 + t−1R−1 ⊗R−1)Dmy > 0
and hence
DTm(Z1 ⊗ Z1 − Z2 ⊗ Z2 + t−1R−1 ⊗R−1)Dm > 0 (68)
Applying all these inequalities to (61), one obtains ∇2xxft <
0, as desired.
Lemma 2. The Hessian
Dr =
[ −T11 T12
T21 T22
]
(69)
is non-singular if partial Hessians T11,T22 are non-singular,
i.e. if T11,T22 > 0, where T11 = −∇2xxft, T12 =
∇2xyft, T21 = TT12 = ∇2yxft, T22 = ∇2yyft.
Proof. Note that Dr is a square nT ×nT matrix, where nT =
m(1+m)/2+n1
∑N
i=1 n2i, so that proving its non-singularity
is equivalent to proving that |Dr| 6= 0. Using an expression
for the determinant of a partitioned matrix [38], we have
|Dr| = | −T11||T22 +T21T−111 T12|
= (−1)nT |T11||T22 +TT12T−111 T12| (70)
where (70) follows since TT12 = T21. According to Lemma 1,
T11,T22 > 0, so that |T11| > 0 and T22 +TT12T−111 T12 > 0
and hence |T22 + TT12T−111 T12| > 0, from which |Dr| 6= 0
follows.
Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we conclude that
the Hessian Dr is non-singular at each step of the Newton
method.
C. Proof of Proposition 3
Let SR(PT ) be the feasible set for a given TPC power
PT . 1st part of Property 1 follows from the fact that if R ∈
SR(PT ), then R ∈ SR(P1) for any P1 ≥ PT , i.e. if R is
feasible for TPC power PT , then it is also feasible for any
higher TPC power P1. 2nd part follows from Property 4.
The concavity can be proved by contradiction. Assume that
C(PT ) is not concave, i.e. there exist powers P1, P2 and
0 < θ < 1 such that
C(θP1 + (1− θ)P2) < θC(P1) + (1 − θ)C(P2) (71)
Now, consider power/time sharing between power levels P1
and P2, i.e. transmitting under TPC power P1 for θ fraction of
time and under TPC power P2 for 1−θ fraction of time, so that
the average Tx power does not exceed Pa = θP1+(1−θ)P2.
LetRk be an optimal Tx covariance under the TPC power Pk,
k = 1, 2. Note that Rk ∈ SR(Pk) implies θR1+(1−θ)R2 ∈
SR(Pa), i.e. this power/time sharing is feasible under the TPC
power Pa and it achieves the secrecy rate equal to the right
hand side of (71), so that, from (71), C(Pa = θP1+(1−θ)P2)
is not the capacity - a contradiction. We remark that using the
standard optimization-based proof, as in e.g. [35] (Exercise
5.32), is not possible here since C(R) is not concave (unless
the channel is degraded). Continuity of C(PT ) follows from
its concavity [39].
To prove Property 3, observe that
C(P ) ≤ C(P2) ≤ C(P1) (72)
for any P ≤ P2 ≤ P1, since C(P ) is non-decreasing, and
hence
C(P ) = C(P2) = C(P1) (73)
if C(P ) = C(P1). It follows that C(P )
′
+ = 0 and thus
C(P1)
′
+ = 0 for any P1 ≥ P , since C(P )′+ is non-increasing
(since C(P ) is concave) so that, from Corollary 24.2.1 in [39],
C(P1) = C(P ) +
∫ P1
P
C(p)′+dp = C(P ) (74)
for any P1 ≥ P . 2nd statement follows from 1st one.
To prove Property 4, use Corollary 24.2.1 in [39] again,
C(PT ) = C(P1) +
∫ PT
P1
C(p)′−dp > C(P1) (75)
from which it follows that C(p)′− > 0 for some P1 ≤ p ≤ PT
and hence C(p)′− ≥ C(P1)′− > 0 for any p ≤ P1 so that
C(P1) = C(P2) +
∫ P1
P2
C(p)′−dp > C(P2) (76)
2nd part of this property follows from the fact that C(P )′− is
non-increasing (since C(P ) is concave).
D. Proof of Proposition 4
The proof is by contradiction as follows. First, note that
C(PT ) is an optimal value of the max-min problem (P1) in
(6). Consider now the same problem but without the TPC
(under the IPC only):
(P3) : max
R∈SR(∞)
min
K∈SK
f(R,K) (77)
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for which the respective KKT conditions are
∇Rf(R,K) +M1 −
K∑
j=1
µjW3j = 0, (78)
M1R = 0, µj(tr(W3jR)− PIj) = 0, (79)
tr(W3jR) ≤ PIj , R,M1 ≥ 0, µj ≥ 0, (80)
∇Kf(R,K)−M2 +Λ = 0, (81)
M2K = 0, K,M2 ≥ 0 (82)
where (78)-(80) and (81)-(82) are the KKT conditions for
maximization over R and minimization over K, respectively;
M1(2) ≥ 0 are (matrix) Lagrange multipliers responsible for
R ≥ 0 and K ≥ 0 constraints; Λ is Lagrange multiplier
responsible for the equality constraint in (9); µj ≥ 0 is
Lagrange multiplier responsible for j-th IPC; (78) and (81)
are the stationarity conditions with respect to R and K; the
equalities in (79) and (82) are the complementary slackness
conditions while the inequalities in (80) and (82) are the
primal and dual feasibility constraints.
On the other hand, the KKT conditions of the original
problem (P1) are
∇Rf(R,K) +M1 − µI −
∑
j
µjW3j = 0, (83)
M1R = 0, µ(tr(R) − PT ) = 0, µj(tr(W3jR)− PIj) = 0,
(84)
tr(R) ≤ PT , tr(W3jR) ≤ PIj , R,M1 ≥ 0, µ, µj ≥ 0
(85)
∇Kf(R,K)−M2 +Λ = 0, (86)
M2K = 0, K,M2 ≥ 0 (87)
where µ ≥ 0 is Lagrange multiplier responsible for the TPC.
Now note that any solution of the KKT conditions of (P1)
in (83)-(87) with µ(PT ) = 0 also solves (78)-(82) and hence
(P3) (since the KKT conditions are sufficient for optimality
in both cases). Thus, if µ(PT ) = 0, then
C(PT ) = C(∞) ≥ C(P0) > C(PT ) (88)
i.e. a contradiction, where the last inequality is from Property
1 in Proposition 3. Hence, we conclude that µ(PT ) > 0 for
any PT < P0. Once can further show that µ(PT ) = 0 for any
PT > P0: observe that C(PT )
′
− = C(PT )
′
+ = C(PT )
′ = 0 if
PT > P0 (since C(PT ) = C(P0) for any PT > P0 from the
definition of P0) and hence µ(PT ) = C(PT )
′ = 0.
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